Excerpt: ...of California (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967)...

Excerpt: ...th particularity. Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795. When a statutory cause of action is alleged, “the plaintiff must set forth facts in his complaint sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5. Regent contends this cau...

Excerpt: ...esult his wife took him to the emergency room operated by Defendant Desert Regional Medical Center (DRMC). While there, Nunes alleges he was mistreated by an emergency room physician, Dr. Lee (also referred to by the parties as Dr. Do or Lee Do), a LVN, McDade, and other staff because he is transgender. Specifically, relative to Dr. Lee: Page 5 of 6 • On November 27, 2019, Mr. NUNES woke up from a dead sleep to a severe pain in his left flank. ...

Excerpt: ... Analysis: Thornton was obligated to comply with section 9.E and 9.H. of the CMO issued by the Court on 6‐20‐2014. Thornton concedes that it did not comply with the CMO after it appeared in December of 2015. (Oppo., p. 3.) It nevertheless claims that the motion should be denied. The Court disagrees. First, Thornton claims that the CMO has “expired” and “is no longer in place.” (Oppo., p. 2 & 4.) That unsupported assertion is false. No...

Excerpt: ...ackground: On 7/17/19, Plaintiffs purchased a used 2016 Nissan Quest (“subject vehicle”), which they allege is considered a “new” vehicle under the Song‐Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song‐Beverly”). The subject vehicle had 39,476 miles when plaintiffs purchased it and cost them $36,946.24. Plaintiffs allege they received written and implied warranties from Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (defendant or Nissan) along with the...

Excerpt: ...rbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479. The petition to compel must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. Cal. R. Ct. 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218–219. “[U]nder t...

Excerpt: ...ummary judgment bears the initial burden of proving that there is no merit to a cause of action by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037.) Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or...

Excerpt: ...rate statement is procedurally and substantively defective. Defendants further assert that there are triable issues of fact as to each affirmative defense. In Reply, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' evidence creates no material factual disputes for trial. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants various procedural arguments are meritless. ANALYSIS A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when no triable issue of material fact exists or t...

Excerpt: ... forth in Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 (Martinez). Because Mehtar and Naji could potentially be liable even without being an “employer” under Labor Code sections 558 and 1197.1, plaintiffs' PAGA notice cannot be invalid for failing to identify Mehtar or Naji as the “employer.” Because the facts alleged in the opening statement indicate that Mehtar and Naji might both qualify as an “employer” under the Martinez test, plaintif...

Excerpt: ...services Sonata provided. The facts seem to suggest, however, Sonata provided services relating to medical care and in‐ home wound care, similar to the facts in Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 382. Plaintiff alleges, for example, “[Sonata] neglected to provide medical care for [Plaintiff's] physical and mental health needs by failing to take all the necessary steps to properly care for her . . . failed to adequately ...

Excerpt: ...imes, including periods after the corporation, with whom, the lease named, had dissolved. On 2/22/22, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) forcible entry under C.C.P. § 1159, (3) forcible detainer, (4) constructive eviction, (5) trespass, (6) premises liability, and (7) negligence. Defendant, Merchant's Financial Guardian, Inc., (Merchant) demurrers as to the seventh causes of action on...

Excerpt: ...ge of the summons and complaint in this matter, the proofs of service in the present action and the San Bernardino Action, the unconfirmed order granting plaintiff's motion to quash in the San Bernardino Action and a copy of the certificate of assignment in this action. The request is granted. COMPULSORY CROSS‐COMPLAINTS There are two types of cross‐complaints ‐ compulsory and permissive. A compulsory crosscomplaint is one that must be file...

Excerpt: ... application, state courts required litigants to exhaust their administrative remedies. [Citations.] The exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional: a court cannot hear a case before a litigant exhausts administrative remedies.” (Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 664–665.) Plaintiff's request for judicial notice purports to show that she has exhausted remedies by complaining to the prison about what she alleges in the co...

Excerpt: ...o should be stricken in its entirety. Therefore, that request is denied. It appears that the plaintiff's motion to tax is directed exclusively to the costs claimed for the preparation of the AR. The recovery of that cost is not expressly authorized by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a). Nor is it expressly disallowed. (Id., subd. (b).) However, costs not mentioned may be recoverable in the court's discretion if they were reasonably n...

Excerpt: ... Plaintiff alleges that the subject vehicle had unrepairable defects related to the transmission. Specifically, he alleges that 2010‐2019 Chevrolet vehicles, including his, came equipped with a defective 8L90 MYC Hydra‐Matic Automatic Transmission that caused (1) reduced acceleration at low speed and/or (2) transmission‐slipping at launch as well as (3) sudden shuddering during acceleration. Plaintiff alleges the vehicle was presented to GM...

Excerpt: ...xt. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ...

Excerpt: ...open the case by vacating the Judgment entered due to additional new evidence. Facts/Procedural History This is a negligence action. For purposes of the factual and procedural history of this case, the Court shall not recite in detail what has already transpired, but hereby incorporates the statements made in its Ruling on Submitted Matter filed on November 2, 2021. However, for purposes of these two motions, the pertinent facts are as follows: P...

Excerpt: ... according to the complaint, the Plaintiff paid tens of thousands of dollars to the Defendants for the express purpose of paying off the mortgage on the property because he was in fact the purchaser of the property. Plaintiff claims that the money he paid was not applied to the mortgage, but was, at least in significant part, taken without authorization and utilized for the personal use and benefit of the defendant(s). According to the complaint,...

Excerpt: ...drawal of “deemed admissions” ordered by a court under section 2033.280(b), as well as admissions expressly made by a party. Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.1 Section 2033.300 is designed to eliminate underserved windfalls obtained through requests for admission and to further the policy favoring resolution of lawsuits on the merits. Therefore, any doubts must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. New Albertsons, ...

Excerpt: ...��Opposition/Response” of Mitsubishi Cement Corporation, the Court tentatively rules as follows: Centro: The Watermaster proposed that the FPA be reduced from 65% of BAP to 60%. The Court approves that proposal. The Court orders that the FPA for all producers in Centro is reduced to 60% of BAP for Water Year 2022‐2023. Este: The Watermaster proposed that the FPA be reduced from 65% of BAP to 60%. However, the Watermaster also asked the Court ...

Excerpt: ...had or had not used any of Paramount's proprietary information. The declarations supporting the motion say that new information was uncovered in discovery, but does not address the nature of the new information that was uncovered. The motion alleges counsel could not have acted faster because Paramount needed an employee to explain “attorney eyes” documents and the stipulated protective order says that an employee can only do that if Pilotte ...

Excerpt: ...epared to address that issue. Administrator Fees The Court's tentative ruling of 5‐12‐22 stated: The “invoice” from the administrator is not credible, for at least two reasons. First, although the administrator's declaration states that there were 396 class members, the invoice says that only 392 notice packets were mailed. There is no explanation offered for that inconsistency. More significantly, the amount of most of the separate charg...

Excerpt: ...e statute specifically provides otherwise. The statute need not expressly authorize attorney fees on appeal. (Morcos v. Board of Retirement County of Los Angeles Employees' Retirement Ass'n (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927.) In this case, this Court already determined Plaintiffs to be the prevailing party in this action. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred on the appeal. The question is whether the fees requested are excessive. ...

Excerpt: ...urt awards attorneys' fees of $44,165.00 and costs of $4583.57. Under Civil Code section 1794, the court must make an initial determination as to the actual time expended and then ascertain whether that time, and the monetary charge for that time, are reasonable. (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) The burden is on the prevailing party to demonstrate that fees were allowable, reasonably necessary, and in a reason...

Excerpt: ... application, state courts required litigants to exhaust their administrative remedies. [Citations.] The exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional: a court cannot hear a case before a litigant exhausts administrative remedies.” (Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 664–665.) Plaintiff's request for judicial notice purports to show that she has exhausted remedies by complaining to the prison about what she alleges in the co...