Excerpt: ...portionate share of liability to plaintiff  the amount paid in settlement – i.e., the amount of costs being waived  its financial condition and policy limits. Even if defendant shown the relevant Tech-Bilt factors, the opposing evidence shows a “costs waiver” settlement would be grossly disproportionate to defendant's potential liability. Defendant owed plaintiff a nondelegable duty to maintain its property in a safe condition. (See S...

Excerpt: ...y receive rent from them. (See Opp. at p. 2 and attached 2/25/20 Santillanes decl. at p. 6:15-24, Exs. 3- 5; Singh decl. ¶¶ 3-6, 7a-7c & Exs. 2, 6; RFJN Exs. 1-3.) Plaintiffs have also shown they need this order to prevent defendant from disposing of the properties or interfering with the assignment. The record shows defendant is unreasonably thwarting collection. Except as otherwise stated above, the court finds the 2/25/20 Santillanes declara...

Excerpt: ...r as well, as the issues overlap. (See Obregon v Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 433–435). As a preliminary observation, there appears to be much middle ground between the parties' positions. It is certainly conceivable that both the discovery requests and the protective order are overbroad. The parties may well be able to agree to production of a narrower range of financial records governed by a narrower protective order. They should...

Excerpt: ...ured as the result of the operation of the vehicle.” (Hardin v. San Jose City Lines (1953) 41 Cal.2d 432, 437.) Defendant's cited evidence raises the inference of res ipsa loquitur. It shows plaintiff was injured on an OCTA bus when “the driver ‘increased speed and then changed lanes.'” (Def. SSUF #1-2.) Defendant “is obliged to meet the inference by evidence sufficient to offset or balance it.” (Hardin, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 437.) �...

Excerpt: ...of great liberality in permitting amendments . . . at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial. . . .'” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.) Defendant's challenges to the FAC's legal sufficiency are better handled at a later stage. (See Atkinson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 6:644.) The court may condition a...

Excerpt: ...d to discuss the appropriate amount of the mandatory bond. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).) 15 Almeria. Plaintiff has shown an injunction is warranted after weighing both “the likelihood [he] ultimately will prevail on the merits and the relative interim harm to the parties from the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.'” (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449.) Plaintiff has shown a sufficient probability ...

Excerpt: ...aned money to defendant. Failing to join the other lender creates a substantial risk of exposing defendant to multiple liability. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a)(2)(ii).) On the other hand, this cause of action is not time-barred on the face of the complaint. (See Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.) Defendant allegedly breached the promissory note by repudiating the debt and selling the security in 2019....

Excerpt: ...ine the persons protected and the conduct prohibited.” (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167.) Second, to whatever extent plaintiff seeks a civil harassment restraining order, he is doing so without using the mandatory JCC forms (CH-100, CH-109, etc.). There is no proof of personal service for the paperwork he did use. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (i).) Had he used the correct forms, his request would have been routed to De...

Excerpt: ...he parties can fairly litigate these issues even if the employee's medical records are kept highly confidential under the stipulated protective order. (Cf. 2 CCR § 11069(g).) Motions to Compel re Form Interrogatories Plaintiff Jean Weil's motions to compel further responses to form interrogatories are granted as follows. Defendants Weil & Drage APC, Christine Drage, and Jacqueline Pons-Bunney contend they cannot answer the form interrogatories b...

Excerpt: ...1) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854; see also Def. SSUF #9-10, 13-18, & 20-26.) Plaintiff has not met her shifted burden to show a triable issue of material fact. (See Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) Contrary to defendant's contention, this issue disposes of only the 6th through 9th causes of action. It does not dispose of the 1st through 5th or 10th causes of action, which also allege defendant knew or s...

Excerpt: ...geous that it exceed[s] all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051, internal quotation marks omitted.) Nor does the FAC allege “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051 [internal quotation marks omitted]; accord Wong v. Jing (2010)...

Excerpt: ...) 432 U.S. 333; see also 9/9/19 minute order.) The TAC still fails to allege facts showing the third Hunt factor: “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” (Hunt, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 343.) While plaintiff has narrowed its claims and prayer for relief, the TAC still requires hundreds of minitrials to determine to whether defendants violated any particular member's d...

Excerpt: ...l motion to strike is granted against plaintiffs Cheryl Pesci (individually), Patty Johnson, and Marianne Klee. These three plaintiffs shall pay $2340 in reasonable attorney fees to defendants. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c).) The motion is denied against plaintiffs Robert Pesci (through his guardian Cheryl Pesci) and Jim Pesci. Defendants met their initial burden to show that the 1st cause of action for malicious prosecution is based...

Excerpt: ...nti-SLAPP motion was frivolous – that is, totally and completely without merit and brought in bad faith. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2), 425.16, subd. (c)(1); see also Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199 (Moore); Visher v. City of Malibu (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 364, 371 [“‘trial court may infer subjective bad faith from the pursuit of a frivolous tactic'”].) For 25 years, case law is clear that anti-SLAPP motions ...

Excerpt: ...ope of the mandatory provision, include . . . a dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground the statute of limitations had run . . . .” (Jackson, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.) Nor has plaintiff shown discretionary relief is appropriate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “A party who seeks relief under section 473 on the basis of mistake or inadvertence of counsel must demonstrate that such...

Excerpt: ... a deed of trust need not be recorded. (See Haynes v. ENC Mortgage Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 329, 336-37). The FAC also fails to allege facts showing plaintiffs have standing to challenge the assignment or that plaintiffs offered to tender the disputed loan proceeds. (See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 43; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802)). 2nd cause of action, wr...

Excerpt: ...esorts to Godwin's Law: “This was ‘the dog of the Nazis' in World War II. Hitler's dog, ‘Blondie,' was a German Shepherd.” (SAC, Attachment One.) It is not enough to allege that all German shepherds are vicious. (See Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1371–1372 [breed characteristics insufficient]; see also Lundy v. California Realty (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 813, 822 [“Neither do we believe judicial not...

Excerpt: ...c., § 340.6, subd. (a); Foxen v. Carpenter (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 284, 292; see also Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6-8, 29-57.) By 11/6/16, according to the face of the complaint and the judicially noticed documents, plaintiff knew the underlying facts (including his damages) and defendant had stopped representing plaintiff. (See Def. RJN, Ex. 1-2; Compl. ¶¶ 35- 36, 46, 55.) Thus, the last day to timely bring these claims was 11/6/17. (See Code Civ. Proc., § ...

Excerpt: ...f did not object. (See 11/5/18 minute order.) Both parties then attended mediation. Plaintiff did not exercise her right to withdraw from mediation. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.853.) Apparently, both parties thought it was worth their time to mediate. The parties had dueling summary judgment motions pending when they mediated. The court ultimately denied both motions, finding triable issues. (See 5/13/19 order.) Only nine days later, plainti...

Excerpt: ...917 [negligence elements]; FAC at Page 4, ¶ GN-1.) The FAC sufficiently alleges an unreasonable failure to restrain the dog. Whether it also alleges a failure to warn is immaterial. (See Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39 [demurrer overruled when allegations constitute any cause of action].) 2nd Cause of Action, Strict Liability. The court previously granted plaintiff leave to amend the strict liability ca...

Excerpt: ...o. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 199.) The FAC does so here. It alleges the lease required defendant “to maintain the roof and utility and plumbing systems in good order, condition, and repair.” (FAC ¶ 53.) That sufficiently alleges the substance of the relevant terms. Motion to Strike Defendant's motion to strike is denied. The FAC sufficiently supports the punitive damages claim. It alleges an intentional trespass, whereby defendant knew water wa...

Excerpt: ... “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.) Defendants fail to show the FAC “on its face . . . [is] barred by a statute of limitations.” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007.) “Sometimes, it is difficult for demurrers based on the statute of limitations to succeed because (1) trial and appellate courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properl...

Excerpt: ...ss violation) through allegations like “Secretary Su has directed hearing officers . . . to decide against [plaintiff's members] in all misclassification hearings involving Owner Drivers, no matter the facts or the law.” (SAC ¶ 4; see Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n (1977) 432 U.S. 333.) Even so, the SAC still fails to allege the third Hunt factor: “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation ...

Excerpt: ...v. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851; see also Def. SSUF ¶¶ 24, 29, 33, 37.) But plaintiff met his shifted burden to show triable issues of material fact. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849-850; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); see also Pl. SSUF ¶¶ 24, 29, 33, 37.) Issue #2, General Negligence. By challenging this claim as duplicative of the professional negligence cl...

Excerpt: ..., FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023; accord Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015.) The SAC also fails to state facts sufficient to constitute this cause of action. It fails to allege “conduct that is so outrageous that it exceed[s] all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051, internal quotation marks omitted.) Nor does it allege “emotional distress of s...